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8 consciousness is always in process. Furthermore, rationality is embedded in the process of subject-object interaction. It is a rational process in that the subject cannot be satisfied with a contradiction or negativity: reason compels it to go beyond contradiction. Of this rational dimension Adorno notes that "the concept of determinate negation... sets Hegel off from Nietzsche's... irrationalism". 20 The rather striking contrast that Adorno makes here is that between a process driven by the norms of reason and one -supposedly Nietzsche's -in which the relation of the subject to the object is one in which only the subject's evolutionary drives -never the object -play a role in the process.
Experience, with its dynamic of self-correction, has implications not only for the knowing subject and its inventory of beliefs and concepts. The object that is the focus of the experience is also changed, since it reveals new dimensions of itself in and through our increasingly sophisticated understanding of it. In this sense it becomes a changed object: "in the alteration of the knowledge", Hegel writes, "the object alters for it too, for the knowledge that was present was essentially a knowledge of the object: as the knowledge changes, so too does the object, for it essentially belonged to this knowledge". 21 When we alter our concept, then, we actually transform what we take the object under consideration to be since it is only through conceptualization that we can specify what an object is. Since the subject's beliefs are challenged and transformed in this process and the object in some respects comes to be grasped in new ways, Hegel's account is one in which the subject-object relationship is dynamic and both components are determined anew. Hegel, Adorno claims, "preserves the distinct moments of the subjective and the objective while grasping them as mediated by one another". 22 This idea of reciprocal mediation, as we have seen, is carried into Adorno's philosophy.
An important further feature of determinate negation is that it is, for Hegel, the path of progress. For Hegel determinate negation leads to a transformation of our understanding, forcing us into a distinctive new way of understanding what we do when we think we are making knowledge claims or expressing beliefs. From a perspective that lies outside that of experience itself -the perspective of the phenomenological observer -this can be represented as progress: "The necessary progression and interconnection of the forms of the unreal consciousness will by itself bring to pass the completion of the series". 23 As we shall see, Adorno's disagreement with Hegel essentially concerns this notion of progress, the notion that the dialectic leads in a conclusive direction, since that, for Adorno, reduces dialectic to system. Nevertheless, Adorno recognizes within this something of great philosophical significance: the idea of truth as process. 24 This idea is correlative, of course, to the notion of the dialectic as experience.
Adorno's Disagreement with Hegel
From the material just considered we can see that Adorno's professed indebtedness to
Hegel is no exaggeration. Yet, as we noted at the outset, he is also deeply critical of Hegel. Where does the disagreement between them lie? As suggested, Hegel's commitment to the progressive character of the dialectic turns out to be the central point of contention. What Adorno rejects is the way in which Hegel, according to Adorno, turns away from his own insight into the negativity of the dialectic and ends up with a progressive dialectic that is placed at the service of the system. The evidence cited by Adorno to support this charge of forced progression needs to be examined. Adorno's comments on Hegel's philosophy of history provide an important point of departure for this examination. Hegel's normative commitments are, according to Adorno, instantiated in his socio-historical analyses. These commitments, in the end, drive the dialectic. And, in Adorno's interpretation, they drive the dialectic to follow an agenda, thereby prejudicing the process.
I want to consider separately the issues that motivate Adorno's disagreement with Hegel by examining, first, his critique of Hegel's notion of history and, second, his worries about Hegel's systematization of the dialectic.
Adorno's Disagreement with Hegel: History
The notion of "universal history" is the foundational idea of Hegel's philosophy of history. It signifies history understood as a narrative of progress that connects temporally separate cultures and societies. As such it is a speculative philosophical construction that gives expression to the idea of a historical continuity that cannot be discerned through empirical analysis. Kant, of course, also proposes a universal history, based on what he sees as the thesis of the unfolding of a providential design of nature. 25 It is, however, almost exclusively Hegel's version of the theory that stimulates Adorno's considerable 25 Hegel highlights the difference in this way: "Even if they at the same time profess their faith in a higher power by references to providence and a providential plan, these remain empty ideas, for they also declare explicitly that the plan of providence is beyond their cognition and comprehension" (G. It is important to note that, for Adorno, discontinuity does not stand on its own. History is a process made up of discontinuous events. History therefore, Adorno writes, "is the unity of continuity and discontinuity". 32 This is not a paradox: it means actually understanding historical events as events and not as moments. When events are conceived as mere moments, history is understood to sweep over the suffering they contain. Hegel situates this suffering within the overarching narrative of progressive history and thereby deprives it of its specificity. In this, Adorno claims, Hegel "transfigured the totality of historic suffering into the possibility of the self-realizing absolute".
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Rejection of the notion of progress is, however, no straightforward matter for Adorno. To abandon it means, minimally, (a) denying that progress is possible and, maximally, (b)
arguing for its opposite, regression. Option (a) cannot be endorsed without further qualification by critical theory, since critical theory understands itself to be socially transformative and beneficent. And (b), as we saw, would simply be a reversal of Hegel's notion. What Adorno proposes instead, and against the thesis of universal history, is that progress is achievable but only once the narrative of progress itself is abandoned.
An implication of the progress thesis is that the historical situation in which we find ourselves is now the result of prior historical progress. When societies operate under this positive self-conception, however, they find no need for radical self-analysis. Their central challenge becomes, rather, that of continuing the project of societal amelioration that has already been well established by the historical process. The task of a critical theory is to bring into doubt settled questions about the deepest normative commitments of our society. It is, in this way, as Axel Honneth puts it, "evaluative world disclosure". commit himself to a notion of historical harmony even while describing history as a "slaughter-bench"? 37 Adorno's thought is that so long as history is understood to be a metaphysical matter the painful details of material life will not significantly determine its course. And Hegel does indeed regard history as a matter of metaphysics. Adorno's position, however, is a historical-materialist one in a broadly Marxist sense, and that means that what Hegel has understood as the engine of history, namely Geist, must in fact be understood as labour. Adorno's concern is that when Hegel conceives of Geist as history as a whole he is, in fact, expressing a conception of society as a whole, one in which each part is fully determined by the whole (just as apparently contingent historical events turn out to be determined by the process of universal history). Hegel's metaphysical commitments reflect the same tendency as his social ones: to bring systematization to the whole (of history and society). Just as the historical narrative is distorted by Hegel to produce a system of history, so he effectively distorts the social totality. But to construe society under a system is to make it into a coercive whole. That is, Adorno believes, Hegel's social-normative commitment. The charge is this: Hegel's "idealism becomes false when it mistakenly turns the totality of labor into something existing in itself, when it sublimates its principle into a metaphysical one, into the actus purus of spirit, and tendentially transfigures something produced by human beings, something fallible and conditioned, along with labor itself, which is the suffering of human beings, into something eternal and right". the social totality: "full reconciliation through spirit in a world which is in reality antagonistic is a mere assertion". 39 The difference between Adorno and Hegel here is a substantial one in that it is a difference that Adorno thinks of as indicative of a difference between materialism and idealism. For Adorno materialism is attentive to individual moments of suffering and to the tangible effects of social arrangements on individuals, whereas idealism, in Hegel's case at least, involves the construction of narratives whose dialectical development transcends in significance the material beings whose lives are determined by that development.
Adorno further articulates it as a difference between particularism and universalism.
Hegel's position drives history toward a system in which particularity is to be absorbed. This is not simply a dispute about "dialectic", that is, about whether the dialectic can produce further moments leading to a harmonious systematic culmination. Insofar as history is the social process, it has become, according to Adorno, a process of constant systematization. This systematization is conceived within modern societies as guided by the desire to coordinate and ultimately harmonize the lives of individuals. A systematized harmonization, however, will contradict this desire in that qua system its priority is not individual difference.
Adorno's Disagreement with Hegel: Dialectic and System
According to Adorno, the normative commitments that are manifest in Hegel's philosophy of history also have a bearing on his account of the operations of the dialectic in more abstract contexts. As we have seen, Adorno construes Hegel as committed to the systematization of historical events into a progressive narrative in which particularity (suffering) is explicated within, and thereby subordinate to, universal history. Adorno's argument is that Hegelian logic, which is supposed to be presuppositionless, is driven by just this synthesizing agenda. Before turning to Adorno's substantiation of this allegation we need to consider what is at stake philosophically, for Adorno, in Hegel's subversion of the dialectic.
For Adorno, the operation of determinate negation is characteristic of experience that is marked by rational responsiveness. Determinate negation, in this context, is an informative moment of experience not because it opens up the object to us directly, but because it indicates the limitation of our judgment about, or conceptualization of, that object. It unsettles our previous belief in the conceptualization of an object. Only indirectly can we read off anything about the object from that process. Adorno argues, however, that Hegel takes the wrong lesson from the process of negativity: he allegedly sees it as bringing us ever closer to the object, indeed to the point at which the object is fully conceptualized. What Hegel's account represents, though, is a subversion of the dialectic, since it is, in this way, an effort to make the latter positive. Against this Adorno argues that "[t]he non-identical is not to be obtained directly, as something positive on its part, nor is it obtainable by a negation of the negative. The negation is not an affirmation itself as it is to Hegel". 40 For Adorno dialectic -negative dialectic -articulates that nonidentity without attempting to carry it into a system as Hegel supposedly does in his pursuit of "absolute consistency". 41 It is for this reason that Adorno alleges that Hegel attempts to "dispute away the contradiction between idea and reality", 42 that is, in effect, to overcome non-identity. While the dialectic is the experience of non-identity, it becomes, ultimately, a moment of the Hegelian system (a reconfiguration that parallels that of the philosophy of history): "Hegel actually takes cognizance of that dimension only for the sake of identity, only as an instrument of identity".
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Obviously enough, this charge of subversion is quite schematic, though it is hardly new or controversial to think of Hegel as a systematic thinker. What Adorno needs to make good on is the claim that Hegel's systematicity is actually distorting, that is, that it manipulates "the dialectic" in order to deliver outcomes required for the system. Adorno needs to do this not merely to establish the accuracy of his interpretation of Hegel, but also to justify his criticism of the rationality of Hegelian dialectic itself. Adorno insists that the negative character of the dialectic should mean that it cannot be part of a process that brings about "the completion of the series". What it truly is is the capacity for nonidentity. It therefore cannot be rendered into a procedure that converts moments of nonidentity into moments of a system. System implies the final ordering of the moments and resolution of the contradictions. In his published writings Adorno does not justify his criticism in any great detail. A useful corroboration of his interpretation is, however, provided in his posthumously published lectures on the idea of a negative dialectic.
In the lectures Adorno analyzes the most famous example of a "transition" in Hegel's work, that of being, nothing, and becoming. He argues that the dialectic is distorted to namely, the absence of determinateness as such takes the place of what is undetermined". 51 And the transition of thought from being to nothing occurs thereby. Yet, Adorno contends, "the equality of being and nothing depends on thinking of being as indeterminateness; in other words, being is supposed from the outset to belong to the conceptual sphere. If it were still the indeterminate -as Hegel writes at first [... ] it would not be possible to equate it with nothing. For a something can be undetermined, but it cannot be said of it that it is 'as good as nothing'." 52 Adorno's criticism does, at least, raise the issue of the apparent inconsistency of Hegel's terminology. Hegel uses two terms, but his initial framing of the idea of pure being is as "the indeterminate" which meets his criterion of being a simple immediacy.
Indeterminateness, precisely as an abstract concept, cannot, however, be immediacy. A rather awkward defence of Hegel might be that, in fact, Hegel is ambiguous on the matter.
His statement that pure being is "purely and simply an immediacy, or rather merely immediacy itself " refers both to the substratum idea and the concept. Nevertheless
Adorno's critical analysis puts significant pressure on the text. And it is informative in relation to the broader issue of how Adorno actually roots his programmatic criticism of Hegel, whom he sees as distorting the dialectic, in specific analyses.
The allegation of distortion is not an end in itself. Adorno is not out simply to make a philosophical criticism, but a philosophical point about the fate of non-identity within systematic thinking. He claims that Hegel's initial "manoeuvre" -from the indeterminate to indeterminateness -is indicative of a desire to conjure "away the nonconceptual".
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For Adorno, Hegel's idea of "the indeterminate" indicates his recognition of the nonconceptual, since it is the idea of something that is not saturated with the concepts or "determinations" of the subject. The transformation of "the indeterminate" into "indeterminateness", however, conceptualizes it absolutely.
The Hegelianism of Adorno's Critical Theory: An Assessment
Having examined Adorno's general appropriation of Hegel as well as his specific criticisms of the dialectic, we should now consider whether that appropriation produces a coherent philosophical position. This consideration brings us to the critical employment that Adorno makes of the materialistically transformed notions of determinate negation and dialectic. These notions have specific roles within Hegel's philosophy, but can they be extracted from that context in order to produce the framework for a form of social critique?
The innovative ambition of critical theory -Adorno's in particular -is to develop modes of critique that do not operate from ideal or utopian perspectives. After all, those perspectives are easily characterized as arbitrary, ungrounded, and not at all compelling.
We might describe utopian assertions as extra-normative. They are extra-normative in that they are a demand for transformed social arrangements and human relations that could not resonate with the conventional perspective of the individual for whose benefit the consciousness-raising exercise of progressive social theory is conceived. The demand, for example, for the abolition of private property would place in doubt a great many conventional assumptions about what society is while also bringing into question moral codes that support the preservation of private property. An extra-normative claim seems to ask the individual to reject all of these assumptions and codes. The critic of extranormativity denies that such a rejection can come about just by referring individuals to higher values given that so much of an individual's social identity is invested in the conventional perspective. Adorno's term for extra-normative criticism, in fact, is "transcendent" in that it imagines itself to operate outside the influence of the conventional perspective. He writes: "The transcendent critic assumes an as it were
Archimedean position above culture and the blindness of society". 54 This transcendent position or norm is known to the philosopher, thanks to some advanced perspective, but it is unknown otherwise. That is to say, it has no normative force -it is merely a philosophical construction -for the conventional perspective. The problem with extranormativity, clearly enough, is that as a tool of critique it actually cannot achieve the very thing it needs to achieve, namely, persuasiveness: it lies outside the space of persuasion precisely in being extra-normative. Indeed, Adorno points out that the notion of a transcendent perspective is, in any case, illusory in that it falsely thinks itself free of the effects of reification and the other social conditions it seeks to expose. It congratulates itself on an imaginary purity: "The choice of a standpoint outside the sway of existing society is as fictitious as only the construction of abstract utopias can be". 55 For Adorno, the critique of society ought not to be guided by a transcendent moral preference: to set out a view of the right society with which to contrast the deficiencies of contemporary society simply begs the question. the definition forced upon him by society". 60 This contradiction is one that allegedly sustains society. But the very formulation of this "immanent critique" is not neutral, since the notion that social roles are "forced" upon individuals is disputable. It is certainly not consistent with all reported experience. The significant point here, then, is that in the absence of texts the very idea of what comes to be seen, through immanent critique, as contradictory cannot draw any neutral reader into the argument. What happens, in fact, is that once neutrality is violated we fall into the same difficulty that nullifies the force of transcendent critique.
In view of this problem with neutrality there is a serious question about whether immanent critique can provide a foundation for the variety of critical theory that wishes specifically to avoid extra-normativity. It is, however, unclear whether Adorno himself wanted immanent critique to be regarded as a foundational principle. A great number of Adorno's pronouncements about the "false life" of modern society are unapologetically based on his moral sensibility (and it is still a matter of dispute among Adorno scholars whether that sensibility is the articulation of a philosophically grounded position). To add to the complexity, Adorno occasionally warns us against an exclusively immanent critical approach. For instance: "The alternatives -either calling culture as a whole into question from outside under the general notion of ideology, or confronting it with norms which it itself has crystallized -cannot be accepted by critical theory. To insist on the choice between immanence and transcendence is to revert to the traditional logic criticized in Hegel's logic". 61 This is certainly confusing, as transcendent norms surely cannot be allowed to creep into the critique without undoing the alleged achievements of immanent
critique. Yet it is clear that, for Adorno, immanent critique is merely one moment of social criticism that brings to light problems in society but does not provide constructive solutions to them. It is for this reason that immanent critique and determinate negation are placed together in a single theory: they are distinguishable moments of critique that capture both immanence and transcendence. Determinate negation provides the moment of transcendence in the Hegelian sense, since it takes us beyond what is merely given, through a process of concept revision (or at least through prompting society to reflect on the limits of the concepts that structure its view of the world and on the possibility of revising those concepts). It is to an examination of the coherence of that single theory that we now turn.
As we have seen, determinate negation is, for Hegel, a form of negation, one that has a result. It is the result that emerges from the complication that consciousness experiences as it "suffers... violence at its own hands". Precisely as a result, a determinate negation is posterior to the moment of complication in the sequence of experience: it is the moment when the need to reflect on the commitments that led to that complication becomes apparent to the consciousness undergoing the experience. Let us take two quite different examples. A racist consciousness must confront some of its commitments when it fails to understand why one or more particular members of the ethnic group that he or she denigrates is more talented, intelligent, virtuous than the allegedly superior group to which the racist belongs. A racist society persists, however, for as long as these contradictions are not thematized by the society itself. Or we can consider Hegel's analysis in the Phenomenology of the collapse of the epistemological explanation of knowledge as simple sense certainty. This explanation is built on the insight that the relation between a subject and an object is essentially a relation of a perceiver to a particular. However, dimensions of knowledge are not captured by this explanation. For instance, the sheer immediacy of simple sense certainty excludes conceptuality: concepts are both universals and are mediated. The exclusion of concepts, however, renders knowledge inexpressible. No doubt the theorist of simple sense certainty might want to reformulate the theory in order to accommodate the conceptual dimension without abandoning the priority of particularity. Nevertheless, the commitments that produced the theory in its original articulation are challenged by the experience of sense certainty itself.
The materials of immanent critique -the contents of its judgment -are differently arranged, I suggest. Immanent critique does not explore the complications that consciousness or society itself experiences, but it sets out what the critic of consciousness or society understands to be the contradictions inherent in the object of examination. The social critic thus assembles evidence that critically undermines the supposed rationality of current arrangements (as we have just seen) by showing that they are by their own standards irrational. That is, the critic demonstrates that specific conventional social commitments that sustain society in its current form are, in fact, compromised by the very arrangements that supposedly guarantee those commitments (e.g., the freedom that capitalist societies value is undermined by capitalism itself). However, in order to be motivated to undertake an immanent critique of this kind the social critic must, in fact, be motivated by some prior intuition about the problematic society he or she is interpreting, that is, that it is contradictory. Although the social critic may wish to use this contradiction as a judgment on the falsehood of society, the contradiction does not, in fact, give rise directly to a logic of transformation. That is, the awareness of the apparent incoherence of society's beliefs is not the same thing as moving beyond them.
In this specific way immanent critique is quite a different matter from "determinate negation", which is newly informative about the limits of the criteria through which we know some given phenomenon and thereby implicitly points to the possibility of revising those criteria. In Hegel, as we have seen, determinate negation is, indeed, progressive for the phenomenological observer and contributes to "the completion of the series" of the forms of consciousness. In contrast, precisely as a disintegrating critique, immanent critique, if we deploy it more strictly than Adorno, does not point beyond itself. For example, the disintegration of the ideology of the allegedly free society is no more than just that. It cannot be rigorously interpreted as a demonstration of a dissatisfied demand for freedom or of the fact that freedom is in an unfinished condition any more than it can be read as a demand for total capitalism (the other part of the claim). But could it not be that the outcome of immanent critique -revelation of contradiction -is informative and thus in some sense a determinate negation? It should be clear that the logic of the two processes does not allow for this synthesis. That is not to say that one could not use them both in a unified critical strategy. What one cannot do, however, is to conflate them, as Adorno does. This is a serious matter in that it is a synthesis of the two ideas that produces the distinctive form of social analysis offered by Adorno's critical theory. We can perhaps give greater sharpness to their divergence by looking at the distinction of perspectives that is crucial to the very structure of Hegel's Phenomenology. I suggest, indeed, that these two perspectives parallel those of social criticism. This can be explained as follows. The social critic occupies a vantage point different from that of the experiencer whose beliefs undergo the process of determinate negation. The social critic
is aware of what she takes to be conflicting social beliefs, the necessary contradictions sustaining capitalist society. She knowingly assembles the evidence from the social totality. To move seamlessly between immanent critique and determinate negation is to commit the mistake of conflating these two perspectives.
determinate negation (and the experience through which it results) constitutes a moment in the unambiguous progress of consciousness.
The perspective of the social critic, by contrast, is an external one for whom contradiction plays a key role in the critique of society. Although Rosen does not set out the distinction between immanent critique and determinate negation as I do, as a distinction between the perspectives of the social critic and that of the experiencer, he nevertheless shows how the distinction between the two perspectives of the Phenomenology cannot be crafted into a social-criticism version of Hegel. He takes issue with Habermas's redevelopment of the notion of determinate negation, which, he argues, "identifies it with the phenomenological path taken by self-consciousness". 63 The intention of Habermas's construction is to offer determinate negation as the knowledge of progress, whereas the dual perspective of the Phenomenology assigns that to the perspective of the observer.
Rosen cites Habermas: "The figure of determinate negation applies not to an immanent logical connection but to the mechanism of the progress of a mode of reflection in which theoretical and practical reason are one.… A form of life that has become an abstraction cannot be negated without leaving a trace, or overthrown without practical consequences.
The revolutionized situation contains the one that has been surpassed, because the insight of the new consists precisely in the experience of revolutionary release from the old Rosen, Hegel's Dialectic and Its Criticism, 36. here in that what Habermas actually does in seeing determinate negation as rational progress is to introduce the perspective of the social critic who understands it as a progressive immanent critique.
If we disentangle immanent critique and determinate negation -as we must -we are left with a significantly less potent form of social criticism. Immanent critique is, as we have seen, the privileged perspective of the observer, bearing witness, as it were, to the inner contradictions of society and imagining a society that is free of them. The revelation of these contradictions does not by itself point beyond what generates the contradictionsand in that sense does no more than disintegrate the society under examination -but it is nonetheless motivated by the desire for social progress (in the nuanced sense I attributed to Adorno above). Determinate negation, by contrast, is the actual experience of contradiction, the full significance of which is not transparent to the experiencer.
Conflating immanent critique and determinate negation, as Adorno's social critique does, seems to allow the experience of determinate negation in itself to be progressive (since it takes us beyond the contradictions of society) and immanent critique seems to be unforced (since it proceeds by working through the experience of determinate negation).
It is, however, a conflation -of Hegelian theses -that falls apart on close analysis.
As we have seen, Adorno's appropriation of Hegel's dialectic generates significant philosophical ideas. Non-identity, experience, and mediation -all of them materialist transformations of Hegelian notions -are distinctive and challenging philosophical 65 Rosen, Hegel's Dialectic and Its Criticism, 37. 
